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Abstract The aim of the present study was to (a) extend
previous eyewitness research in autism spectrum disorder
(ASD) using a live and personally experienced event;
(b) examine whether witnesses with ASD demonstrate a
facilitative effect in memory for self- over other-performed
actions; (c) explore source monitoring abilities by wit-
nesses with ASD in discriminating who performed which
actions within the event. Eighteen high-functioning adults
with ASD and 18 age- and IQ-matched typical counterparts
participated in a live first aid scenario in which they and the
experimenter each performed a number of actions. Partic-
ipants were subsequently interviewed for their memory of
the event using a standard interview procedure with free
recall followed by questioning. The ASD group recalled
just as many correct details as the comparison group from
the event overall, however they made more errors. This
was the case across both free recall and questioning phases.
Both groups showed a self-enactment effect across both
interview phases, recalling more actions that they had
performed themselves than actions that the experimenter
had performed. However, the ASD group were more likely
than their typical comparisons to confuse the source of self-
performed actions in free recall, but not in questioning,
which may indicate executive functioning difficulties with
unsupported test procedures. Findings are discussed in
terms of their theoretical and practical implications.
Keywords Autism spectrum disorder  Eyewitness 
Self-enactment effect  Source monitoring  Memory
Introduction
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a developmental dis-
order that is characterised by a triad of impairments in
social interaction, communication and flexible imagination
(American Psychiatric Association 2000). It affects how an
individual makes sense of the world around them and how
they communicate with and relate to other people. Memory
difficulties are also well-documented in the disorder (dis-
cussed in more detail below) allowing novel predictions to
be made regarding the capabilities of individuals with ASD
as eyewitnesses. Moreover, a number of ‘risk’ factors
indicate that people with autism may be more highly rep-
resented in the Criminal Justice System than their 1 %
representation in the general population, as a victim, wit-
ness, or even perpetrator of a crime (e.g., Allen et al. 2008;
Howlin 1997; Petersilia 2001; Woodbury-Smith et al.
2005, but see Woodbury-Smith et al. 2006). It is therefore
important to understand not only how well individuals with
ASD recall events that they have passively observed, but
also how well they recall events in which they played an
active role.
ASD is associated with an uneven memory profile:
rather than having a poor memory per se, some functions,
including semantic memory (e.g., Bowler and Gaigg 2008),
recognition memory and cued recall (e.g., Bennetto et al.
1996) tend to be preserved, at least in high-functioning
individuals with the disorder. Other memory abilities on
the other hand, such as recalling the source of memories
(e.g., Bowler et al. 2004), the spontaneous employment of
organisational strategies to aid memory (e.g., Gaigg et al.
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2008) and the episodic recollection of personally experi-
enced events (e.g., Crane and Goddard 2008; Crane et al.
2009; Klein et al. 1999; Millward et al. 2000), are often
reported to be diminished in ASD compared to their typical
counterparts, at least when unsupported test procedures are
used. Several studies have now explored how this pat-
terning of memory affects eyewitness testimony in ASD
(see Maras and Bowler in press, for a review), however the
pattern of findings is mixed. Some studies report that wit-
nesses with ASD freely recall fewer correct details (Bruck
et al. 2007; Maras and Bowler 2011; Maras et al. 2012;
McCrory et al. 2007; North et al. 2008, but see Maras and
Bowler 2010, 2012), and some report they make more
errors or are less accurate (Maras and Bowler 2011; Maras
et al. 2012, but see Bruck et al. 2007; Maras and Bowler
2010, 2012; McCrory et al. 2007; North et al. 2008).
Two studies to date have explored eyewitness testimony
by children with ASD using a live event, although the
event in these was passively observed rather than enacted.
McCrory et al. (2007) used a live classroom event and
reported that whilst children with ASD freely recalled
around a third less information than typically developing
children did, they were no less accurate with regards to the
proportion of errors or incorrect details that they reported.
Bruck et al. (2007) also reported that ASD children
reported fewer correct details than comparison children in
response to both free recall and specific questions about a
previously witnessed magic show. Of the studies with
adults, none to date have used a live eyewitness event, or
an event in which the witness has actively participated.
This is pertinent given that it is now well established that
individuals with ASD experience difficulties in reflecting
on the self (e.g., Crane et al. 2009, and see Lind 2010),
which extend to impairments in episodic memory (e.g.,
Crane and Goddard 2008; Klein et al. 1999). Indeed, a
number of studies have demonstrated that individuals with
ASD experience particular difficulties recalling specific
and personally experienced autobiographical events (e.g.,
Bruck et al. 2007; Goddard et al. 2007). This impairment is
in the absence of a personal semantic memory deficit
(Crane and Goddard 2008), indicating that it is a deficit
related to episodic memory and autonoetic awareness,
rather than simply a poor memory per se (Bowler et al.
2000, 2007). These findings have led a number of
researchers to suggest that deficits in self-awareness in
ASD lead to impairments in episodic memory and a failure
to use self-involvement to facilitate their memory (e.g.,
Crane et al. 2009; Klein 2001; Millward et al. 2000; Powell
and Jordan 1993). If correct this has important implications
for the eyewitness abilities of individuals with ASD.
The role of the self in facilitating memory in
typical individuals is purported to be due to more effec-
tive encoding by use of a highly organised structure of
self-concept (Symons and Johnson 1997). The self-enact-
ment effect refers to better memory for actions that are
self-performed than actions that are observed being per-
formed by another person (e.g., Baker-Ward et al. 1990).
Whilst self-concept inevitably plays a role in enhancing
encoding, it has also been suggested that a self-enactment
effect results from the additional motoric component of
self-performed actions leading to more salient memory
traces (Engelkamp 1985, Engelkamp and Zimmer 1989).
Given the motor difficulties (e.g., Ming et al. 2007) cou-
pled with diminished self-awareness in ASD (see Lind and
Bowler 2010), it may come as little surprise that a number
of researchers have reported a diminished or absent self-
enactment effect in ASD (e.g., Dunphy-Lelii and Wellman
2012; Farrant et al. 1998; Hare et al. 2007; Millward et al.
2000; Russell and Jarrold 1999; Wojcik et al. 2011).
Russell and Jarrold (1999), for example, asked children
with ASD, children with moderate learning difficulties (to
act as IQ matches for the ASD group) and typically
developing children to remember whether they or the
experimenter had placed a picture card on a grid, either on
their own behalf or on behalf of a doll partner. The children
with ASD were worse than both the typically developing
children and children with learning disabilities at recalling
whether they or the other person had placed a card onto the
grid. Moreover, the children with ASD were actually worse
at recalling which cards they had placed themselves com-
pared to cards that were placed by the experimenter.
It has been argued that individuals with ASD may not
benefit from memory enhancement for self-performed
actions because they fail to fully integrate visual and
sensori–motor signals (Wilson et al. 2007). However,
Williams and Happe´ (2009) adapted a previously used
paradigm by Russell and Hill (2001) to include a more
specific test of the action monitoring deficit hypothesis. In
this task, participants held a computer mouse and either
moved it intentionally themselves, or kept hold of it whilst
the experimenter moved it. Some of the different coloured
squares on the screen moved consistently with the move-
ments of the mouse, and some were moved randomly by
the computer and thus the mouse movements on these trials
were unrelated. If self-performed actions do not result in
better encoding then individuals with ASD should show no
difference in identifying which of the different coloured
squares had moved when they intentionally moved the
mouse themselves or whether the experimenter moved the
mouse that they held. It was predicted that typical indi-
viduals, by contrast, who have a well-developed experi-
enced of the self as an agent, should find the ‘other’
condition significantly more difficult. However, both
groups found it easier to identify the target square when
they were in control of the movement than when they
simply felt the experimenter move it. In a second
J Autism Dev Disord (2013) 43:1798–1810 1799
123
experiment, Williams and Happe´ (2009) failed to replicate
Russell and Jarrold’s (1999) findings of an absent self-
enactment effect and reported that the ASD group, as was
the case with their typical comparisons, found it easier to
monitor and recalled more of their own actions than those
of another person.
Several other researchers have also reported an intact
enactment effect for self- performed actions in ASD (e.g.,
Hare et al. 2007; Lind and Bowler 2009; Summers and
Craik 1994; Zalla et al. 2010), which is problematic for an
action monitoring deficit account. It is possible that the
reported difficulties in utilising the role of the self in
facilitating memory may be dependent on the test proce-
dure used. Findings of intact semantic autobiographical
memory but diminished personal episodic memory (e.g.,
Crane and Goddard 2008) and of an increased reliance on
‘‘knowing’’ alongside diminished autonoetic awareness as
measured by ‘‘remember’’ responses in ASD (Bowler et al.
2000), have led Bowler and colleagues to propose the task
support hypothesis (Bowler et al. 1997, 2004). According
to this account, difficulties in retrieval by individuals with
ASD, as evidenced by their poorer performance compared
to typical individuals, are largely eliminated when more
support for retrieval is provided at test, such as that in the
form of cued recall or recognition tests (cf. environmental
support hypothesis, see Craik and Jacoby 1996). Individ-
uals with ASD tend not to differ from typical individuals in
performance on these tests.
Consistent with the task support account, Zalla et al.
(2010) reported that high-functioning individuals with
ASD did not show the enactment effect for self-performed
actions on tests of free recall, however they did show the
effect on a recognition test, whereby both ASD and com-
parison groups had similarly higher correct recognition for
enacted than observed items, with no difference between
groups. Similarly, Hare et al. (2007) reported that low-
functioning individuals with ASD did not show superior
free recall for self- over other-experienced events, but that
they did show enhanced recall for self-experienced events
when recall was cued. Lind and Bowler (2009) also
observed an enactment effect in the ASD group when they
tested participants using a recognition test. In contrast to
the previous suggested action monitoring deficit account,
Lind and Bowler argue their findings indicate that differ-
ences observed in ASD are likely to be due to a more
general episodic impairment rather than specific self-
memory deficit per se. Because their task was one of rec-
ognition, Lind and Bowler suggested that the ASD group
may have been able to utilise their intact semantic memory
to compensate for their impaired episodic memory.
Difficulties with monitoring the source of memories are
now fairly well established in the ASD memory literature
(see Boucher et al. 2012, for a review). With regards to
monitoring the source of self-other memories (whether the
action was self-performed or performed by the experi-
menter), however, research to date paints a mixed picture.
Some have reported diminished self-other source memory
in ASD (Hala et al. 2005; Lind and Bowler 2009; Russell
and Jarrold 1999), whilst others have reported that indi-
viduals with ASD perform comparably to typical partici-
pants (Farrant et al. 1998; Hill and Russell 2002; Williams
and Happe´ 2009; Zalla et al. 2010). These discrepant
findings may be attributable to two factors. First, as men-
tioned above and accountable by the task support hypoth-
esis, performance in ASD tends to be diminished on free
recall but unimpaired on recognition tests. Since the self-
other source monitoring paradigms involve tests of recog-
nition (‘‘did you pick this card up or did the experimenter
pick this card up?’’), invariably the ASD group’s perfor-
mance will often be better than had they been asked to
freely recall both the action and who performed it. This
type of more supportive recall test also reduces demand on
cognitive load and executive functions, with which indi-
viduals with ASD are often reported to show impairments
(see Hill 2004). Second, as Lind and Bowler (2009) note,
because of the marked difference between ‘‘self’’ and
‘‘other’’, self-other source judgements are more distinct and
thus easier to make than internal (whether an action was
imagined or actually performed) or external (which of two
individuals performed an action) source judgments
(Hashtroudi et al. 1989). This means that studies that have
reported unimpaired self-other source monitoring may
have simply lacked power or sensitivity to detect a sig-
nificant difference.
The purpose of the present study is to extend this to-date
inconsistent work on monitoring the source of actions and
the self enactment effect in ASD using a live eyewitness
scenario. No research to date has examined how well adults
with ASD recall live eyewitness events in which they
actively participated, which is particularly important given
the literature suggesting that this might be problematic for
them. Moreover, if individuals with ASD are at increased
risk of victimisation (e.g., Howlin 1997; Petersilia 2001)
recall of self actions and actions that others perform is
critical. Thus, the aim of the present study is threefold: to
examine (a) how well adults with ASD recall actually
experienced eyewitness events in which they personally
participated; (b) whether adults with ASD show a facili-
tative effect of self- over other-performed actions of an
eyewitness event, as typical individuals do; (c) whether
they show impaired source monitoring for who performed
which actions.
Adults with ASD and their typical counterparts partici-
pated in a live eyewitness scenario whereby they assisted
the experimenter in carrying out some first aid on a man-
ikin-victim. Within this scripted scenario there were a
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number of actions that the experimenter always performed,
and a number of actions that the participant always per-
formed. Participants were later asked to freely recall what
happened, before being questioned further about what
happened. Based on the aforementioned pattern of findings
to date, we predicted that the ASD group would show a
diminished self-other enactment effect on the free-recall
memory phase of the interview, but that there would be no
difference between groups on the questioning phase, which
is analogous to a cued recall test procedure. Given that
free-recall provides no cues and therefore no task support
for memory recall, we also expected the ASD group to
make more source misattributions for whether they or the
experimenter had performed the actions in their free recall,
but not in the more supported questioning phase.
Method
Participants
Eighteen participants with ASD (16 males and 2 females) who
were formally diagnosed by qualified clinicians were recrui-
ted predominantly in London and the South East of the UK
from autism support groups and societies, and from word of
mouth. All ASD participants were diagnosed by experienced
clinicians with local health authorities according to DSM-IV
(American Psychiatric Association 2000) criteria for Autistic
Disorder or Asperger Disorder and diagnoses were confirmed
for all participants by assessment with the Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al. 1999).
Eighteen comparison participants were recruited through
local newspaper advertisements and comprised 15 males
and 3 females who were pairwise matched within 7 points
of verbal IQ as measured by the WAIS-R or WAIS-III UK
(Wechsler 1997) to the ASD participants. They had no
known psychiatric, developmental or neurological disor-
ders. Groups did not significantly differ on age, VIQ, PIQ
or FIQ (all ts \ 1.15, ps [ .26). Table 1 summarises these
data. Participants also completed the Autism Spectrum
Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). None of the
comparison participants exceeded the minimum cut off
score for ASD of 32 (M = 16, range = 4–25), and as
expected the ASD group scored significantly higher
(M = 33, range = 21–45) than the comparison group on
this measure, t (32) = 8.01, p \ .001, Cohen’s d = 2.67.
Participants provided their informed consent and were
warned before taking part in the first aid scenario that they
were about to see a manikin posing as an accident victim so
that they were not alarmed. Ethical approval for the study
was obtained from the Research Ethics Committees at City
University London and Royal Holloway, University of
London.
Materials
The first aid scenario was centred around a manikin, who
was a purported car crash victim. The manikin was
approximately 180 cm in height and made of flexible grey
foam, with facial features but no hair or make-up. The
manikin was dressed as a professional male in smart
trousers, a shirt (with a red biro in the shirt pocket) and tie,
and was also wearing a brown belt, wrist watch and socks.
In his left trouser pocket were a set of keys, and in the right
trouser pocket was a wallet with an ID membership card
inside. The manikin-victim had five notable injuries:
(a) wounded right hand, which was represented with fake
blood on the top of the hand; (b) burn on the left forearm,
again denoted using fake blood; (c) broken right arm,
which was twisted up into an unusual position; (d) broken
left leg, which was crooked at an odd angle; (e) a wound to
the right foot, which was visible through a hole in the sock
and fake blood on both the sock and the foot.
A number of first aid items were present in the same far
right-hand corner of the room. A hazard triangle, foil
blanket, red cotton blanket and green first aid box were all
on the floor next to a table. The first aid kit contained a
number of items including some bandages, band aids, a
pad, scissors, tweezers, gloves and sterile swabs. On the
table was a tea towel, some cling film and a fluorescent
high visibility vest. The experimenter always wore the
same clothes and jewellery, including a scarf which she
subsequently removed during the scenario to use as a sling.
An A2-size photograph print was hung on the far wall
opposite the door depicting a car crash, in which two cars
were severely damaged following an obvious collision.
Design and procedure
Participants were tested individually, and to avoid spon-
taneous context reinstatement at interview the first aid
scenario was carried out in a different building from the
Table 1 Age and IQ scores for the ASD and comparison groups
(standard deviations in parentheses)
ASD (N = 18) Comparison (N = 18)
Age
(years)
41.11 (13.12) range
25–63
45.94 (11.99) range
25–61
VIQa 110.94 (11.16) range
81–123
110.78 (12.46) range
82–128
PIQb 106.89 (13.13) range
84–128
108.78 (13.57) range
75–136
FIQc 109.83 (12.12) range
81–127
110.72 (13.55) range
77–135
a Verbal IQ
b Performance IQ
c Full-scale IQ (WAIS-R UK or WAIS-III UK)
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subsequent memory interview. Participants were informed
that their task was to help the experimenter carry out some
first aid on a manikin–victim, and that the experimenter
would instruct them on what they needed to do. On
entering the room the experimenter pointed out the picture
on the wall and explained that the manikin-victim had been
in a car crash and had sustained a number of injuries. The
first aid scenario then followed which comprised a series of
actions performed by both the experimenter and partici-
pant, which were balanced to ensure that the experimenter
and participant each carried out both salient and trivial
actions (see ‘‘Appendix’’). In order to control for any
potential effects of verbal scaffolding from participants
receiving instructions for their own actions, the experi-
menter provided the same level of verbal description of her
own actions as that of the participant’s (e.g., participant-
performed task: ‘‘can you check his pockets’’; e.g., exper-
imenter-performed task: ‘‘I am just going to check if he is
breathing’’). During the scenario there were 19 scripted
actions performed by the experimenter, and 19 that were
performed by the participant (e.g., Other-performed action:
the experimenter gets a bandage from the first aid kit; e.g.,
Self-performed action: the participant rolls the bandage
up). The scenario began with an initial assessment and
precautionary measures (e.g., putting a hazard triangle out
and checking breathing), before each of the injuries were
dealt with in turn. Full details of the actions that occurred
in the scenario can be found in ‘‘Appendix’’.
Event scenarios were videoed through a two-way mirror
for quality control purposes to ensure that they all followed
the script accurately, and to double-check for any incon-
sistencies from participants’ reports of what happened
during their interview. Following the first aid scenario
participants were engaged in similar unrelated tasks for
around 1 h, before being interviewed for their memory of
the first aid event by a different experimenter from the one
who carried out the first aid event with them.
Interview
Interviews followed the same standard structure recom-
mended by government to professionals who interview
witnesses, as outlined by the Home Office (2011) Achiev-
ing Best Evidence guidance. Interviews began with rapport
building, and then the aims and structure of the interview
was explained to the participant, where they were given the
opportunity to ask questions. The interviewer explained
that they should try to recall everything in as much detail as
they could about what happened and what they could see
during the first aid scenario, and that they should particu-
larly try to recall the finer details of exactly who did what
during the scenario. Participants were reminded that the
interviewer did not know what happened and that their task
was to describe the event as accurately as they could.
The free recall (FR) phase then followed, whereby the
participant was instructed to take their time and to recall as
much as they could from the scenario. Once the participant
had finished speaking and was waiting for the next
instruction, they were asked ‘‘can you remember anything
else?’’ When they had responded to this and/or indicated
that was all they could recall, the questioning phase began.
The participant was once again instructed not to guess and
that it was ok to say if they did not know the answer to any
questions. Questions followed a structured sequence to
probe for information pertaining to each of the actions and
who performed them, and for descriptions of what things
looked like. All participants were asked the same ques-
tions, but only if they had already mentioned that topic in
their FR or previously in the questioning. For example,
where a participant mentioned that they had put a bandage
on the manikin, they were asked who had fetched the
bandage. However, if no mention was made of using the
bandage this question was not asked. Similarly, if a par-
ticipant had mentioned that the manikin was wearing a tie
they would be asked for more information about what the
tie looked like. Questions were witness-compatible (i.e.,
using the witness’s own terminology) and were predomi-
nantly open-ended. Closed questions were kept to a mini-
mum and leading and misleading questions were avoided.
All interviews were video and audio-recorded for sub-
sequent transcription and coding.
Coding and preliminary analyses
Interviews were transcribed and each detail that the par-
ticipant mentioned was coded against a coding template of
actions and descriptions of items and people that were
present in the scenario. The script contained a total of 19
Self-performed and 19 Other-performed actions (‘‘Appen-
dix’’). Details were only coded the first time they were
mentioned. However, where a participant mentioned an
action in free recall but failed to specify at the time who
had carried out the action (e.g., ‘‘we put a bandage on’’),
this was followed up in the questioning phase, and their
answer to this prompting (e.g., ‘‘I put the bandage on’’) was
coded as having been mentioned in the free recall phase.
Each detail reported was coded as ‘‘correct’’ (e.g., ‘‘the
victim’s shirt was blue’’), incorrect (e.g., ‘‘his shirt was
red’’), or confabulated (e.g., ‘‘the victim was wearing a
hoody’’), with the exception of the 19 Self- and 19 Other-
performed actions, which were coded as correct or incor-
rect only (confabulations were scored separately from self
and other details). Self errors were coded where a self-
performed action was misattributed to having been per-
formed by the experimenter, and Other errors were coded
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where the participant incorrectly attributed that they per-
formed an action that was actually performed by the
experimenter.
In addition to the main scripted items, there were also a
number of actions that inevitably always occurred (e.g.,
removing the band aid from its packaging, the participant
and experimenter kneeling down etc.) Actions such as
these that always occurred in all participants’ scenarios
were scored if they were reported correctly, but were not
tagged specifically as Self or Other. Actions that occurred
only in an individual participant’s scenario (i.e., those that
went off-script) were not scored, in order to ensure that all
participants had an equal number of potential details to
score on. In addition to these action details, recall was also
scored for details pertaining to people (i.e., what the
manikin and the experimenter were wearing and descrip-
tions of the people present in the photograph of the car
crash), objects (e.g., the first aid items) and surroundings
(e.g., what the room looked like and the location of items).
For example, the statement ‘‘Anna got the red blanket from
the corner and I lifted his leg and put the blanket under-
neath it’’ would be coded as 1 Other-performed action
correct (got the blanket), 1 Self-performed action correct
(lifted his leg), 1 Other-performed action incorrect (saying
that the participant had put the blanket under the leg, when
in fact it was the experimenter who had done this) and 3
correct details about the item and its location (it was red, it
was a blanket and it was in the corner).
A second independent rater blindly scored eight randomly
selected interview transcripts (four in each group) against the
event script and the resulting Pearson’s correlations between
the two raters were good for each type of detail, and
importantly also for those specifically pertaining to self
and other details: rcorrect = .97, p \ .0001, rincorrect =
.81, p \ .05, rconfabulations = .92, p \ .001, rselfcorrect = .95,
p \ .001, rself incorrect = .90, p \ .005, rother correct = .99,
p \ .001, rother incorrect = .92, p \ .001. We also examined
potential differences between groups in interview length,
and there was no significant difference between the ASD
and comparison groups for interview duration (ASD
M = 22 min 19 s, SD = 6 min; comparison M = 19 min
48 s, SD = 4 min), t (34) = 1.36, p = .18, Cohen’s
d = .51.
Results
Group differences in completeness and accuracy
of recall
Our first step was to examine differences in recall between
groups and between the FR and questioning phases. Details
were coded as being correct, incorrect or confabulated, and
three separate ANOVAs were performed for each detail
type, with group as the between participants factor and
interview phase as the within participants factor. As can be
seen in Table 2, the ASD and comparison groups did not
differ in the completeness of their recall (i.e., the number of
correct details they recalled), F \ 1, and there was no
group x interview phase interaction, F (1, 34) = 1.62,
p = .21, gp2 = .05. That is, the ASD group reported just as
many correct details as their typical counterparts in both
the FR and questioning phases. The ASD group did,
however report significantly more incorrect details than the
typical group, F (1, 34) = 11.08, p \ .005, gp2 = .25, and
a lack of group x interview phase interaction, F \ 1,
indicated that they did so in both FR and questioning
phases. Analysis of confabulations indicated that groups
did not significantly differ in the number of confabulations
made, F (1, 34) = 3.16, p = .08, gp2 = .09, and there was
no interview phases x group interaction for confabulations,
F \ 1. Thus, the ASD group made significantly more
errors (e.g., reporting that the first aid box was on the table,
when actually it was on the floor) than their typical coun-
terparts in both FR and questioning phases, but there were
no significant group differences in the tendency to con-
fabulate about details (e.g., reporting that they performed
emergency resuscitation techniques on the manikin, when
in fact this did not occur at all).
There was a main effect of interview phase for the number
of correct details recalled, F (1, 34) = 11.30, p \ .005,
gp2 = .25, whereby more correct details were recalled in the
first FR phase (M = 49.32, SD = 19.41) than in the second
questioning phase (M = 39.21, SD = 13.72). This finding is
unsurprising given that coding was only for new items.
Interview phase also had an effect on the number of incorrect
details reported, F (1, 34) = 41.65, p \ .001, gp2 = .55,
with significantly fewer incorrect details reported in FR
(M = 3.69, SD = 2.49) than in questioning (M = 8.75,
SD = 4.17). A similar pattern emerged for confabulations,
where more confabulations were made in questioning
(M = .69, SD = .95) than in FR (M = .31, SD = .75),
F (1, 34) = 4.86, p \ .05, gp2 = .13.
Table 2 Group differences in correct, incorrect and confabulated
detailed reported in each interview phase (standard deviations are in
parentheses)
Correct Incorrect Confabulated
Free recall
ASD 46.44 (21.85) 4.81 (2.67)** .44 (.98)
Comparison 52.19 (16.76) 2.58 (1.74) .17 (.38)
Questioning
ASD 40.17 (16.65) 10.11 (4.78)* .94 (1.00)
Comparison 38.25 (10.41) 7.39 (2.99) .44 (.86)
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01
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Recall of self versus other performed actions
In order to assess the pattern of recall for Self- versus
Other-performed actions, we conducted two mixed ANO-
VAs for correct details for each free recall and questioning
phase, where group (ASD vs. Comparison) was the
between-participants factor, and detail type (Self vs. Other)
was the within-participants factor. There was a main
effect of detail type in FR, F (1, 34) = 105.54, p \ .001,
gp2 = .76, but no group 9 detail type interaction,
F (1, 34) = 1.44, p = .24, gp2 = .04. In contrast to our
prediction that the self-other enactment effect would be
diminished in the ASD group relative to the comparison
group, both groups similarly reported more correct actions
that they had performed themselves than actions that they
had watched the experimenter perform in their FR
(Table 3). A similar pattern emerged for Self- versus
Other-performed actions in the questioning phase, however
this difference fell short of traditional statistical signifi-
cance levels, F (1, 34) = 3.10, p = .087, gp2 = .08, which
may be related to a limited number of Self and Other
details left available to be recalled following the FR phase.
Again, there was not a group 9 detail type interaction,
F \ 1. These data can be seen in Table 3.
Source monitoring
Next we assessed source memory for Self- and Other-
performed actions. We predicted that the ASD group would
make more source confusion errors on the FR, but not in
the questioning phase. As reported above, both groups
demonstrated the self-enactment effect by reporting sig-
nificantly more self- than other-performed actions, and here
we were interested in whether both groups correctly
attributed themselves or the experimenter as having per-
formed each of these types of actions. Thus, we compared
differences between groups in the number of Self and
Other errors made within each interview phase. As can be
seen in Table 3, the ASD group made significantly more
Self errors than the comparison group in the FR phase,
F (1, 34) = 15.87, p \ .001, gp2 = .32, but not in the
questioning phase, F \ 1. Groups did not differ in number
of Other errors made in either the FR phases, F \ 1, or in
the questioning phase, F \ 1. Thus, the only difference
between groups in terms of source confusions (who per-
formed which actions) was for Self-performed actions in
FR. That is, compared to their typical counterparts, the
ASD group incorrectly attributed more actions that they
themselves had performed as having been performed by the
experimenter when they were asked to freely recall what
had happened. This difference between groups in source
monitoring errors for self-performed actions was dimin-
ished, however, in the questioning phase, and there were no
differences between groups in the number of source errors
made for actions that were performed by the experimenter.
Because the number of errors for self-performed actions
was quite low overall, we inspected the proportions of
individuals in each group who made such errors. All but
one of the participants with ASD (i.e., 94 %) made at least
one source error for self-performed actions. In contrast
only six individuals in the comparison group (i.e., 33 %)
made this type of error.
Discussion
The present study is the first to examine how well adults
with ASD recall a personally experienced live eyewitness
event. In recalling this event, we were interested in whether
the ASD group demonstrated a self-enactment effect and
whether they could successfully monitor the source of their
own and another’s actions. To this end, three main findings
emerged. First, the ASD group’s recall was just as com-
plete as that of their typical comparisons, but they made
more errors. Second, both ASD and comparison groups
showed an enactment effect: they recalled more actions
that they had performed themselves than they did actions
that the experimenter had performed. Third, when asked to
freely recall what happened, the ASD group made signifi-
cantly more source confusions than the comparison group
in attributing actions that they had actually performed
themselves as having been performed by the experimenter.
The use of a live event in this study is novel and demon-
strates that, from a forensic perspective, if adults with ASD
are personally involved in a crime as a witness, victim or
perpetrator, they can recall just as many correct details as
their typical counterparts, but that their recall may be less
accurate (i.e., contain more errors). Moreover, if they are
questioned appropriately or provided with environmental
support they can provide information about source as
accurately as their counterparts. We now consider each of
these findings in turn in more detail.
Table 3 Recall of Self- versus Other-performed actions: correct
details and source confusions for each interview phase (standard
deviations are in parentheses)
Self correct Self
error
Other
correct
Other error
Free recall
ASD 8.78 (3.39) .78 (.73) 4.00 (3.01) 1.50 (1.50)
Comparison 10.33 (3.45) .06 (.24) 6.56 (3.20) 1.06 (1.16)
Questioning
ASD 3.56 (3.13) .72 (.96) 3.17 (1.79) .94 (.10)
Comparison 3.17 (1.82) .50 (.86) 2.17 (1.34) 1.39 (1.65)
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Completeness and accuracy of recall
With regards to the eyewitness abilities of individuals with
ASD in recalling a personally experienced event, findings
from the present study are positive in that they show that
individuals with ASD recall just as many correct details as
their typical comparisons in both the FR and questioning
phases of interview. However, witnesses with ASD were
more prone to making errors when reporting in both stages,
despite explicit interview instructions not to guess if they
were unsure of anything. As mentioned in the introduction,
despite the fact that all previous studies used homogeneous
samples of high-functioning adults with ASD, their find-
ings regarding both the completeness and accuracy of
eyewitness testimony to date are mixed. Our findings of
similar levels of completeness of the reports of witnesses
with ASD to their typical counterparts are consistent with
some existing studies (e.g., Maras and Bowler 2010; Maras
et al. 2012) but inconsistent with others (e.g., Bruck et al.
2007; Maras and Bowler 2011; McCrory et al. 2007). It
could be concluded from the present findings that indi-
viduals with ASD recall more details if the event is salient,
live and personally participated in, but given the incon-
sistent findings previously reported, future work is needed
to clarify and confirm this interpretation. Similarly, the
same might be said for errors, where again our findings add
to a mixed picture, with more errors reported by some
studies (Maras and Bowler 2011; Maras et al. 2012), but
not others (Bruck et al. 2007; Maras and Bowler 2010;
McCrory et al. 2007). That the questioning phase elicited
more errors than the FR phase for both groups replicates
and extends to witnesses with ASD the finding of the
majority of existing studies that show this effect with
typical individuals.
Outside of eyewitness research, the pattern of findings
remains somewhat mixed, and it is therefore difficult to
pinpoint an explanation for the discrepant findings across
studies. Studies of story recall by high-functioning indi-
viduals with ASD, for example, have reported both unim-
paired (e.g., Ambery et al. 2006; Boucher et al. 2005) and
impaired performance (Minshew and Goldstein 2001;
Salmond et al. 2005; Williams et al. 2006). It is possible
that high-functioning individuals are inherently impaired in
recalling an event, but that they develop compensatory
strategies, for example with an increased reliance on the
semantic memory system, to compensate for this deficit
(see Boucher et al. 2012, for further discussion), leading to
a mixed pattern of findings across studies regarding both
the completeness and the accuracy of their reports. Nev-
ertheless, findings from the present study indicate that,
from a forensic perspective, victims or suspects with ASD
may recall just as many correct details as their typical
counterparts, but that forensic professionals might seek to
exercise caution in verifying the details that are given in an
account by a witness with ASD.
Self-enactment effect
Contrary to our initial predictions, the ASD group showed
a similar self-enactment effect to the comparison group in
both their FR and questioning. That is, they recalled more
actions that they had performed themselves than they did
actions that the experimenter had performed. This is an
important finding practically because it indicates that if an
individual with ASD is the victim or perpetrator of a crime
they will be able to recall what happened and what they
did. Theoretically this finding is also important because it
indicates that individuals with ASD do lay down a stronger
memory trace for self-performed actions. Based on previ-
ous research (Hare et al. 2007; Zalla et al. 2010) and the
task support hypothesis (Bowler et al. 2004) we expected
that the ASD group would only demonstrate an undimin-
ished enactment effect on the questioning phase, and not in
the unsupported FR phase. It should be noted, however,
that not all studies have reported a diminished self-enact-
ment effect in FR for ASD: Summers and Craik (1994) also
reported that their ASD group recalled more self-per-
formed tasks, although the comparison task in their study
was a list of word items, rather than similar action-related
tasks being performed by another person. The conditions in
their study could therefore not control for potential scaf-
folding from the nature of a visual action-related task
irrespective of whether it was self-performed or not.
There are two interpretations of the present data. The
first, and the interpretation that we favour, is that individ-
uals with ASD genuinely do benefit from self-enactment
and that a more general episodic deficit explains previous
findings of a diminished enactment effect, whereby dif-
ferences between groups are quantitative, rather than
qualitative in nature (see Lind 2010). The second is that the
effect is diminished in ASD, but that we failed to detect a
difference in the present paradigm. We will briefly consider
each of these possibilities in turn. Some have argued that
action monitoring is, in fact, intact in ASD and that the
difficulties observed in previous studies have reflected a
more general episodic memory deficit, as opposed to a
specific difficulty with personally experienced events (Lind
and Bowler 2009, Williams and Happe´ 2009; and see Lind
2010, for a review). Our overall findings support this
interpretation: if it were a deficit specific to personally
experienced events, then one would expect the ASD group
in the present study to recall fewer details overall than the
comparison group from the personally experienced event.
Such a difference should be particularly marked given that
some previous eyewitness studies that have used event
stimuli that were not personally participated in have
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reported diminished completeness of recall (e.g., Bruck
et al. 2007; Maras and Bowler 2011; McCrory et al. 2007).
Yet we found the ASD group recalled just as many correct
details overall as their typical counterparts from this per-
sonally experienced event. Moreover, several studies have
previously reported a self-enactment effect in ASD (Hare
et al. 2007; Lind and Bowler 2009; Summers and Craik
1994; Williams and Happe´ 2009; Zalla et al. 2010), indi-
cating that individuals with ASD do lay down a stronger
memory trace for self-performed actions.
A second interpretation is that we failed to detect a
diminished enactment effect because of the paradigm and/
or high-functioning adult sample that took part. Hender-
son et al. (2009), for example, reported age-related
improvements in self-referenced memory in their sample
of 8- to 16-year-olds with ASD. Thus, one might argue
that participants in the present study might have shown
diminished self-referenced memory effects earlier in
development, but had improved to such an extent by
adulthood that it was not detectable in the current study,
possibly also because of the narrative structure of the
event. Whilst we were cautious to keep verbal commen-
tary of the task to a minimum and ensured that it occurred
equally for self- and other-performed actions, it was
nevertheless inevitable in order to instruct participants
which actions to perform, which might have enhanced
encoding through verbal scaffolding. Williams and Happe´
(2009) failed to replicate Russell and Jarrold’s (1999)
findings and reported that their ASD group did, in fact,
demonstrate an enactment effect. Williams and Happe´
suggest that the discrepant findings might be related to the
experimenter engaging the participant in more verbal
commentary in their study than in Russell and Jarrold’s
experiment. This, they argue may have led to events
being encoded as self-experienced and thus recalled
accurately from memory. There is some evidence to
suggest that people with ASD tend not to use certain
forms of inner speech (e.g., Whitehouse et al. 2006,
Williams et al. 2012) and thus, Williams and Happe´
argue, these overt verbal descriptions of the actions at the
time may have been a sort of ‘outer speech’ which served
to scaffold performance. This is the major interpretation
that we consider of the present data to explain the
enactment effect in FR as well as questioning. Finally, it
is also worth noting that whilst the experimenter was
cautious to perform their actions whilst the participant
attending to them, the nature of the event—designed to be
more ecologically valid—means that we cannot rule out
the possibility that factors relating to attention did not
play a role in the enactment effect. In light of our pre-
cautions to prevent this happening, coupled with previous
work showing that individuals with ASD do show a
beneficial effect of self-enactment on memory, we do not
believe this to be the case. It is, nevertheless, worth
noting that a trade off between experimental control and
ecological validity is often inevitable.
Source monitoring of self- and other-performed actions
In line with our predictions, but in contrast to the findings
reported above that the ASD group did demonstrate a self-
enactment effect in both their FR and in questioning is the
finding that they made more source errors for self-per-
formed actions than the comparison group in FR. The ASD
group confused more actions that they had performed
themselves as having been performed by the experimenter
than did the comparison group. This finding is in fact in
stark contrast to some previous work (e.g., Lind and
Bowler 2009), which has reported the enactment effect in
terms of better source monitoring for self- than other-per-
formed actions in ASD. This is somewhat of a paradox
within the present findings: Whilst individuals with ASD
appear to use their self-involvement to lay down a stronger
memory trace for their own actions (and hence recall more
self than other actions), in free recall they are more likely
than typical individuals to confuse self-performed actions
as having been performed by the experimenter. If they are
using their self-involvement to strengthen their memory for
these actions, then it is difficult to explain why they are
more likely to confuse the source of who performed them.
However, the ASD group do not show a greater source
monitoring confusion than their typical counterparts when
questioned, and it appears to be independent of a more
general source monitoring deficit, because we did not find
the ASD group to be more likely to confuse the source of
other-performed actions.
So how do we explain such a finding? We only observed
this deficit in source monitoring in FR and not questioning,
and one possibility relates to executive functioning, which
can be further interpreted within the task support frame-
work. In the FR phase, participants were instructed to recall
as much as they possibly could about what happened,
without any cues from the interviewer. This requires
holding a large amount of information of what they could
remember about the event ‘‘online’’ whilst simultaneously
switching attention between details in order to select what
to verbally recall and in what order. The instruction to
report everything including the finer details of who did
what increases this cognitive load on executive functions.
Individuals with ASD have been reported to have a number
of executive function deficits including working memory,
mental flexibility (spontaneously switching attention
between different thoughts or actions) and prepotent inhi-
bition (see Hill 2004, for a review). It is also widely
observed that individuals with ASD can show inaccurate
production and reversal of pronouns (e.g., Jordan 1989;
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Lee et al. 1994; Loveland and Landry 1986; Mizuno et al.
2011). The ASD group made more source monitoring
errors for self-performed actions in FR (‘‘tell me what
happened and who did what’’), but not in questioning (‘‘did
Anna get the bandage or did you get the bandage?’’) In
contrast to FR, questioning essentially provides task sup-
port for executive functions by breaking down the infor-
mation that is required for recall into smaller segments,
hence directing attention to one source, reducing cognitive
load and placing less demand on working memory, inhi-
bition and set shifting. Thus, it is possible that the source
monitoring errors observed in FR simply reflect executive
function deficits triggering pronoun confusion, rather than
a genuinely diminished enactment effect.
It is also possible that the ASD group have a more lenient
response criterion than their comparisons and hence freely
report more details that they are uncertain about. Of course,
these are only conjectures, but it is an important area for future
research to explore because if correct it has implications for
forensic interviews in eliciting information from witnesses
with ASD. One of the most widely-reported findings in the
eyewitness literature, which police take on board in practice, is
that FR is the optimal method of recalling an event to obtain
the most reliable reports and that questioning, whilst eliciting
more details, also results in a concomitant increase in errors
(Home Office 2011; Loftus 1996). It may be the case that
individuals with ASD, however, need more specific direction
in interviews to focus their recall into smaller segments and
minimise demands on executive functions and thus potentially
reduce the likelihood of source confusion errors.
Related to an executive function account, the self-source
monitoring difficulties in FR displayed by the ASD group
might also be partly explained in the context of simulation
theories (e.g., Gordon 1986). These theories posit that
understanding of others is achieved through understanding
self-representations. Meltzoff (2007), for example, reports
that during development social cognition shifts from ‘others
are like me’ to a dual acknowledgement that whilst others
can be like us, they can also be different. Recalling who did
what requires the simultaneous understanding of the differ-
ing viewpoints of others, and might account for the ASD
group confusing the source of self-performed actions, whilst
still benefitting from an enactment effect in recalling more of
the self-performed actions themselves. This interpretation is
supported by findings from O’Shea et al. (2005) who
reported that, whilst unimpaired in source monitoring for
impersonal items of information, the ASD group had specific
difficulties in recalling the source of the person-related
detail. If the distinction between self and other is less
explicitly distinctive, individuals with ASD may have more
specific difficulties with spontaneously teasing apart and
accurately reporting the source of person-performed details
on tests of FR.
Conclusions
Previous research has reported mixed findings across all
three of our research questions. That is, recall of a past
event, the self-enactment effect, and source monitoring.
Our findings add to this mixed picture, but from our pri-
mary objective of the forensic implications regarding the
abilities of individuals with ASD in recalling a previously
participated-in event, our findings indicate that witnesses,
victims or suspects with ASD are likely to recall just as
many details as their typical counterparts. Moreover find-
ings indicate that self-involvement boosts memory for
actions that witnesses with ASD perform themselves.
However, findings also suggest that forensic professionals
might seek to exercise caution in verifying the accuracy of
details that are given in an account by a witness with ASD.
This is the first study to look at this within an eyewitness
context, and findings have implications for the recall of
events by victims and suspects with ASD, whom by defini-
tion would have played an active role in the event. Of course,
a limitation of this study is that, in contrast to a real criminal
event, it would have held relatively little emotional valence.
It is therefore important for future work to extend this using a
negatively valenced event, and with a larger sample. Our
data also indicate that, on tests of free recall, individuals with
ASD may be more likely to verbally confuse the source of
self-performed actions, which may arise from executive
function demands. Again, given the forensic implications,
this is something that could be followed up.
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Appendix: Summary of self- and other-performed
actions in scripted first aid scenario
Self- and other-performed actions are denoted by (S)
and (O), respectively.
Assessing situation/initial actions
The experimenter asks the participant to get (S) and put out
the hazard triangle (S) the experimenter takes the fluores-
cent tabard from table (O) and gives it to the participant to
put on (S). The experimenter goes over the manikin and
says ‘‘Hello, can you hear me?’’ (O). She then taps the
manikin on the shoulders (O).
The participant checks the manikin’s trouser pockets
(S) and finds keys and a wallet/card. The experimenter
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takes the card and reads out the name on it (O). The
experimenter says ‘‘Are you ok, James?’’ (O) and puts her
ear to his mouth to check his breathing (O). The participant
loosens his tie (S) and the experimenter undoes his top two
shirt buttons (O).
Hand wound
The participant gets a tea towel from the table (S) and
holds it on the hand to stop the bleeding (S) whilst the
experimenter lifts the arm (O) to reduce blood flow to the
area. Once the experimenter indicates that the bleeding has
stopped the experimenter gets a bandage (O) from the first
aid kit (which is already unravelled). The experimenter
then takes the tea towel away (O), and the participant rolls
up the bandage (S). The experimenter wraps the bandage
around the manikin’s hand (O) and the participant ties the
knot in the bandage (S).
Burn
The experimenter rolls the manikin’s sleeve up (O) and
says that he has a burn on his arm that has cooled but needs
to be wrapped in cling film. The participant takes off his
wrist watch (S) and gets the cling film from the table (S).
The experimenter opens the cling film and holds it out over
the burn (O) and then the participant takes over and wraps
it round the burn (S).
Broken leg
The experimenter says that the manikin’s leg looks like it
might be broken and gets a cotton blanket from the corner
(O). The participant lifts the leg (S) so that the experi-
menter can place the blanket under (O) to stabilise it. The
participant then gets the foil blanket (S) and wraps it
around the manikin (S) to keep him warm.
Broken arm
The experimenter explains that the arm may also be broken
so they need to put a sling on it. The participant gets a pad
from the first aid kit (S). The experimenter takes off her
scarf (O), and takes the pad and puts it between the man-
ikin’s arm and chest (O). The participant pulls the scarf-
sling under the arm (S) and the experimenter ties it in a
knot at the end (O).
Foot wound
There is a hole in one of the manikin’s socks, so the par-
ticipant removes it to check for a wound (S). The experi-
menter takes a band aid from the first aid kit (O), and the
participant sticks the band aid on the wound (S).
References
Allen, D., Evans, C., Hider, A., Hawkins, S., Peckett, H., & Morgan, H.
(2008). Offending behaviour in adults with Asperger syndrome.
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38(4), 748–758.
doi:10.1007/s10803-007-0442-9.
Ambery, F. Z., Russell, A. J., Perry, K., Morris, R., & Murphy, D. G. M.
(2006). Neuropsychological functioning in adults with Asperger
syndrome. Autism, 10(6), 551–564. doi:10.1177/1362361306068507.
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical
manual of mental disorders (4th Edition (DSM-IV) ed.).
Washington DC: American Psychiatric Press.
Baker-Ward, L., Hess, T. M., & Flannagan, D. A. (1990). The effects
of involvement on children’s memory for events. Cognitive
Development, 5(1), 55–69. Retrieved from doi:10.1016/0885-
2014(90)90012-I.
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Skinner, R., Martin, J., & Clubley,
E. (2001). The autism-spectrum quotient (AQ): Evidence from
Asperger syndrome/high-functioning autism, males and females,
scientists and mathematicians. Journal of Autism and Develop-
mental Disorders, 31(1), 5–17.
Bennetto, L., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1996). Intact and
impaired memory functions in autism. Child Development,
67(4), 1816–1835. doi:10.2307/1131734.
Boucher, J., Cowell, P., Howard, M., Broks, P., Farrant, A., Roberts,
N., et al. (2005). A combined clinical, neuropsychological, and
neuroanatomical study of adults with high functioning autism.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 10(3), 165–213. doi:10.1080/13546
800444000038.
Boucher, J., Mayes, A., & Bigham, S. (2012). Memory in autistic
spectrum disorder. Psychological Bulletin, 138(3), 458–496.
doi:10.1037/a0026869.
Bowler, D. M., & Gaigg, S. B. (2008). Memory in ASD: enduring
themes and future prospects. In J. Boucher & D. M. Bowler
(Eds.), Memory in autism (pp. 330–349). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bowler, D. M., Gardiner, J. M., & Berthollier, N. (2004). Source
memory in adolescents and adults with Asperger’s syndrome.
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34(5), 533–
542. doi:10.1007/s10803-004-2548-7.
Bowler, D. M., Gardiner, J. M., & Gaigg, S. B. (2007). Factors
affecting conscious awareness in the recollective experience of
adults with Asperger’s syndrome. Consciousness and Cognition,
16(1), 124–143. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.12.001.
Bowler, D. M., Gardiner, J. M., & Grice, S. J. (2000). Episodic
memory and remembering in adults with Asperger syndrome.
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 30(4),
295–304. doi:10.1023/A:1005575216176.
Bowler, D. M., Matthews, N. J., & Gardiner, J. M. (1997). Asperger’s
syndrome and memory: Similarity to autism but not amnesia.
Neuropsychologia, 35(1), 65–70. doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(96)
00054-1.
Bruck, M., London, K., Landa, R., & Goodman, J. (2007). Autobio-
graphical memory and suggestibility in children with autism
spectrum disorder. Development and Psychopathology, 19(1),
73–95. doi:10.1017/s0954579407070058.
Craik, F. I. M., & Jacoby, L. L. (1996). Aging and memory:
Implications for skilled performance. In W. A. Rogers, A.
D. Fisk, & N. Walker (Eds.), Aging and skilled performance:
Advances in theory and applications. Rogers. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Crane, L., & Goddard, L. (2008). Episodic and semantic autobio-
graphical memory in adults with autism spectrum disorders.
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38(3),
498–506. doi:10.1007/s10803-007-0420-2.
1808 J Autism Dev Disord (2013) 43:1798–1810
123
Crane, L., Goddard, L., & Pring, L. (2009). Sensory processing in
adults with autism spectrum disorders. Autism, 13(3), 215–228.
doi:10.1177/1362361309103794.
Dunphy-Lelii, S., & Wellman, H. M. (2012). Delayed self recognition
in autism: A unique difficulty? Research in Autism Spectrum
Disorders, 6(1), 212–223. doi:10.1016/j.rasd.2011.05.002.
Engelkamp, J. (1985). Motor programs and their relation to semantic
memory. German Journal of Psychology, 9(3), 239–254.
Engelkamp, J., & Zimmer, H. D. (1989). Memory for action events: A
new field of research. Psychological Research, 51(4), 153–157.
doi:10.1007/BF00309142.
Farrant, A., Blades, M., & Boucher, J. (1998). Source monitoring by
children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 28(1), 43–50. doi:10.1023/A:1026010919219.
Gaigg, S. B., Gardiner, J. M., & Bowler, D. M. (2008). Free recall in
autism spectrum disorder: The role of relational and item-specific
encoding. Neuropsychologia, 46(4), 983–992. doi:10.1016/
j.neuropsychologia.2007.11.011.
Goddard, L., Howlin, P., Dritschel, B., & Patel, T. (2007). Autobio-
graphical memory and social problem-solving in Asperger
syndrome. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders,
37(2), 291–300. doi:10.1007/s10803-006-0168-0.
Gordon, R. (1986). Folk psychology as simulation. Mind and
Language, 1, 158–171. Reprinted in M. Davies and T. Stone
(eds.), Folk psychology: The theory of mind debate, Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1995.
Hala, S., Rasmussen, C., & Henderson, A. M. E. (2005). Three types
of source monitoring by children with and without autism: The
role of executive function. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 35(1), 75–89. doi:10.1007/s10803-004-1036-4.
Hare, D. J., Mellor, C., & Azmi, S. (2007). Episodic memory in adults
with autistic spectrum disorders: Recall for self- versus other-
experienced events. Research in Developmental Disabilities,
28(3), 317–329. doi:10.1016/j.ridd.2006.03.003.
Hashtroudi, S., Johnson, M. K., & Chrosniak, L. D. (1989). Aging and
source monitoring. Psychology and Aging, 4(1), 106–112.
doi:10.1037/0882-7974.4.1.106.
Henderson, H. A., Zahka, N. E., Kojkowski, N. M., Inge, A. P.,
Schwartz, C. B., Hileman, C. M., et al. (2009). Self-referenced
memory, social cognition, and symptom presentation in autism.
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 50(7), 853–861.
doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2008.02059.x.
Hill, E. L. (2004). Evaluating the theory of executive dysfunction in
autism. Developmental Review, 24(2), 189–233. doi:10.1016/
j.dr.2004.01.001.
Hill, E. L., & Russell, J. (2002). Action memory and self-monitoring
in children with autism: Self versus other. Infant and Child
Development, 11(2), 159–170. doi:10.1002/icd.303.
Home Office. (2011). Achieving best evidence in criminal proceed-
ings: Guidance on interviewing victims and witnesses, and
guidance on using special measures (3rd ed.). London: HMSO.
Howlin, P. (1997). Autism: Preparing for adulthood. London:
Routledge.
Jordan, R. R. (1989). An experimental comparison of the under-
standing and use of speaker-addressee personal pronouns in
autistic children. International Journal of Language & Commu-
nication Disorders, 24(2), 169–179. doi:10.3109/13682828909
011954.
Klein, S. B. (2001). A self to remember: A cognitive neuropsycho-
logical perspective on how self creates memory and memory
creates self. In C. Sedikides & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Individual
self, relational self, collective self. New York: Psychology Press.
Klein, S. B., Chan, R. L., & Loftus, J. (1999). Independence of
episodic and semantic self-knowledge: The case from autism.
Social Cognition, 17(4), 413–436. doi:10.1521/soco.1999.17.
4.413.
Lee, A., Hobson, R. P., & Chiat, S. (1994). I, you, me, and autism: An
experimental study. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 24(2), 155–176. doi:10.1007/BF02172094.
Lind, S. E. (2010). Memory and the self in autism: A review and
theoretical framework. Autism, 14(5), 430–456. doi:10.1177/
1362361309358700.
Lind, S. E., & Bowler, D. M. (2009). Recognition memory, self-other
source memory, and theory-of-mind in children with autism
spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 39(9), 1231–1239. doi:10.1007/s10803-009-0735-2.
Lind, S. E., & Bowler, D. M. (2010). Episodic memory and episodic
future thinking in adults with autism. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 119(4), 896–905. doi:10.1037/a0020631.
Loftus, E. F. (1996). Eyewitness testimony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Lord, C., Rutter, M., DiLavore, P., & Risi, S. (1999). Autism
diagnostic observation schedule–generic. Los Angeles: Western
Psychological Services.
Loveland, K. A., & Landry, S. H. (1986). Joint attention and language
in autism and developmental language delay. Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 16(3), 335–349. doi:10.1007/
BF01531663.
Maras, K. L., & Bowler, D. M. (2010). The cognitive interview for
eyewitnesses with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 40(11), 1350–1360. doi:10.1007/
s10803-010-0997-8.
Maras, K., & Bowler, D. M. (2011). Brief report: Schema consistent
misinformation effects in eyewitnesses with autism spectrum
disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 41(6),
815–820. doi:10.1007/s10803-010-1089-5.
Maras, K. L., & Bowler, D. M. (2012). Context reinstatement effects
on eyewitness memory in autism spectrum disorder. British
Journal of Psychology, 103(3), 330–342. doi:10.1111/j.2044-
8295.2011.02077.x.
Maras, K. L. & Bowler, D. M. (in press). Eyewitness testimony in
autism spectrum disorder: A review. Journal of Autism and
Developmental Disorders. doi:10.1007/s10803-012-1502-3.
Maras, K. L., Gaigg, S. B., & Bowler, D. M. (2012). Memory for
emotionally arousing events over time in autism spectrum
disorder. Emotion. doi:10.1037/a0026679.
McCrory, E., Henry, L. A., & Happe´, F. (2007). Eye-witness memory
and suggestibility in children with Asperger syndrome. Journal
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48(5), 482–489.
doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2006.01715.x.
Meltzoff, A. N. (2007). The ‘‘like me’’ framework for recognizing and
becoming an intentional agent. Acta Psychologica, 124(1),
26–43. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2006.09.005.
Millward, C., Powell, S., Messer, D., & Jordan, R. (2000). Recall for
self and other in autism: Children’s memory for events
experienced by themselves and their peers. Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 30(1), 15–28. doi:10.1023/
A:1005455926727.
Ming, X., Brimacombe, M., & Wagner, G. C. (2007). Prevalence of
motor impairment in autism spectrum disorders. Brain &
Development, 29(9), 565–570. doi:10.1016/j.braindev.2007.03.
002.
Minshew, N. J., & Goldstein, G. (2001). The pattern of intact and
impaired memory functions in autism. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 42(8), 1095–1101. doi:10.1111/
1469-7610.00808.
Mizuno, A., Liu, Y., Williams, D. L., Keller, T. A., Minshew, N. J., &
Just, M. A. (2011). The neural basis of deictic shifting in
linguistic perspective-taking in high-functioning autism. Brain,
134(Pt 8), 2422–2435. doi:10.1093/brain/awr151.
North, A., Russell, A., & Gudjonsson, G. (2008). High functioning
autism spectrum disorders: An investigation of psychological
J Autism Dev Disord (2013) 43:1798–1810 1809
123
vulnerabilities during interrogative interview. Journal of Foren-
sic Psychiatry & Psychology, 19(3), 323–334. doi:10.1080/1478
9940701871621.
O’Shea, A. G., Fein, D. A., Cillessen, A. H. N., Klin, A., & Schultz,
R. T. (2005). Source memory in children with autism spectrum
disorders. Developmental Neuropsychology, 27(3), 337–360.
doi:10.1207/s15326942dn2703_3.
Petersilia, J. R. (2001). Crime victims with developmental disabili-
ties—A review essay. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 28(6),
655–694. doi:10.1177/009385480102800601.
Powell, S. D., & Jordan, R. R. (1993). Being subjective about autistic
thinking and learning to learn. Educational Psychology, 13(3–4),
359–370. Retrieved from doi:10.1080/0144341930130312.
Russell, J., & Hill, E. L. (2001). Action-monitoring and intention
reporting in children with autism. Journal of Child Psychology
and Psychiatry, 42(3), 317–328. doi:10.1111/1469-7610.00725.
Russell, J., & Jarrold, C. (1999). Memory for actions in children with
autism: Self versus other. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 4(4),
303–331. doi:10.1080/135468099395855.
Salmond, C. H., Ashburner, J., Connelly, A., Friston, K. J., Gadian, D.
G., & Vargha-Khadem, F. (2005). The role of the medial
temporal lobe in autistic spectrum disorders. The European
Journal of Neuroscience, 22(3), 764–772. doi:10.1111/j.1460-
9568.2005.04217.x.
Summers, J. A., & Craik, F. I. M. (1994). The effects of subject-
performed tasks on the memory performance of verbal autistic
children. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24(6),
773–783. doi:10.1007/BF02172285.
Symons, C. S., & Johnson, B. T. (1997). The self-reference effect in
memory: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 121(3),
371–394. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.121.3.371.
Wechsler, D. (1997). Manual for the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale (3rd ed.). San Antonio, TX: The Psychological
Corporation.
Whitehouse, A. J. O., Maybery, M. T., & Durkin, K. (2006). Inner
speech impairments in autism. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry, 47(8), 857–865. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2006.
01624.x.
Williams, D. M., Bowler, D. M., & Jarrold, C. (2012). Inner speech is
used to mediate short-term memory, but not planning, among
intellectually high-functioning adults with autism spectrum
disorder. Development and Psychopathology, 24(1), 225–239.
doi:10.1017/S0954579411000794.
Williams, D. L., Goldstein, G., & Minshew, N. J. (2006). The profile
of memory function in children with autism. Neuropsychology,
20(1), 21–29. doi:10.1037/0894-4105.20.1.21.
Williams, D., & Happe´, F. (2009). Pre-conceptual aspects of self-
awareness in autism spectrum disorder: The case of action-
monitoring. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders,
39(2), 251–259. doi:10.1007/s10803-008-0619-x.
Wilson, T. W., Rojas, D. C., Reite, M. L., Teale, P. D., & Rogers, S. J.
(2007). Children and adolescents with autism exhibit reduced
MEG steady-state gamma responses. Biological Psychiatry,
62(3), 192–197. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2006.07.002.
Wojcik, D. Z., Allen, R. J., Brown, C., & Souchay, C. (2011).
Memory for actions in autism spectrum disorder. Memory, 19(6),
549–558. doi:10.1080/09658211.2011.590506.
Woodbury-Smith, M. R., Clare, I. C. H., Holland, A. J., & Kearns, A.
(2006). High functioning autistic spectrum disorders, offending
and other law-breaking: Findings from a community sample.
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 17(1), 108–120.
doi:10.1080/14789940600589464.
Woodbury-Smith, M. R., Clare, I. C. H., Holland, A. J., Kearns, A.,
Staufenberg, E., & Watson, P. (2005). A case-control study of
offenders with high functioning autistic spectrum disorders.
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 16(4), 747–763.
doi:10.1080/14789940500302554.
Zalla, T., Daprati, E., Sav, A.-M., Chaste, P., Nico, D., & Leboyer, M.
(2010). Memory for self-performed actions in individuals with
Asperger syndrome. PLoS ONE, 5(10), e13370. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0013370.
1810 J Autism Dev Disord (2013) 43:1798–1810
123
